This book analyzes a series of decisions by leaders of three major terrorist organizations and identifies a unique "Decision DNA" for each of them. The authors use the Applied Decision Analysis methodology to examine organizational and operational decisions made by the leaders of three major groups: Hezbollah (Hassan Nasrallah), Hamas (Khaled Mashal), and al-Qaeda (Osama bin Laden). Decisions that were of critical importance to each organization are identified and anaylzed, to uncover the particular decision rule employed by the leader in question and to establish their "Decision DNA." A Decision DNA is unique to each leader and can be used to explain previous decisions or predict future choices. The authors demonstrate that the findings presented can be used to promote effective counterterrorism measures, and they provide a series of policy implications that arise from their examination of each leader. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorist studies, political violence, security studies, and Middle Eastern politics.

How and why do people make political decisions? This book is the first to present a unified framework of the Behavioral Political Science paradigm. - BPS presents a range of psychological approaches to understanding political decision-making. The integration of these approaches with Rational Choice Theory provides students with a comprehensible paradigm for understanding current political events around the world. Presented in nontechnical language and enlivened with a wealth of real-world examples, this is an ideal core text for a one-semester courses in political science, American government, political psychology, or political behavior. It can also supplement a course in international relations or public policy.

This book presents an overview of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) resource allocation issue, considering the period from 1948 to 1980. It describes the major characteristics of the DoD resource allocation process and discusses the potential impact of various shocks on the allocation system.

This book presents an overview of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) resource allocation issue, considering the period from 1948 to 1980. It describes the major characteristics of the DoD resource allocation process and discusses the potential impact of various shocks on the allocation system.

This volume brings together leading scholars from the US, Europe and Asia in search of new perspectives on and answers to questions about how a country's defence burden might affect welfare provision and economic growth, and vice versa. The essays examine and compare the historical experiences of a variety of developed and developing countries and include analyses of: - the link between defence spending and economic performance in the United States - the causes of Britain's relative decline - the institutional setting for Japan's pursuit of comprehensive national security - the influence of military spending on the developmental progress of Asia's newly industrializing countries - the patterns of business cycles and military hostility in the Middle East. The contributors offer new insights and often surprising findings regarding the relationship between defence burden and political economy. The essays are therefore highly pertinent to the ongoing scholarly and policy debates about the process of a peace dividend in the wake of the Cold War s demise. This book should be of interest to postgraduates of politics, international relations, international political economy.

This collection of essays examines the political economy approach to military spending, primarily by the United States. The articles deal specifically with the relationships between defence spending and: (a) political-business cycles, public opinion and the US-Soviet relationship; (b) military action - ie war; (c) economic performance - the trade deficit, guns versus butter issues and fiscal policy.

This book analyzes a series of decisions by leaders of three major terrorist organizations and identifies a unique "Decision DNA" for each of them. The authors use the Applied Decision Analysis methodology to examine organizational and operational decisions made by the leaders of three major groups: Hezbollah (Hassan Nasrallah), Hamas (Khaled Mashal), and al-Qaeda (Osama bin Laden). Decisions that were of critical importance to each organization are identified and anaylzed, to uncover the particular decision rule employed by the leader in question and to establish their "Decision DNA." A Decision DNA is unique to each leader and can be used to explain previous decisions or predict future choices. The authors demonstrate that the findings presented can be used to promote effective counterterrorism measures, and they provide a series of policy implications that arise from their examination of each leader. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorist studies, political violence, security studies, and Middle Eastern politics.

Why do presidents and their advisors often make sub-optimal decisions on military intervention, escalation, de-escalation, and termination of conflicts? The leading concept of group dynamics, groupthink, offers one explanation: policy-making groups make sub-optimal decisions due to their desire for conformity and uniformity over dissent, leading to a failure to consider other relevant possibilities. But presidential advisory groups are often fragmented and divisive. This book therefore scrutinizes polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and divergent policy prescriptions, resulting in a disjointed decision-making process or even decision paralysis. The book analyzes eleven national security decisions, including the national security policy designed prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the decisions to enter into and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2007 "surge" decision, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the UN Security Council decision on the Syrian Civil War, the faltering Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East, and the U.S. decision on military operations against ISIS. Based on the analysis of these case studies, the authors address implications of the polythink phenomenon, including prescriptions for avoiding and/or overcoming it, and develop strategies and tools for what they call Productive Polythink. The authors also show the applicability of polythink to business, industry, and everyday decisions.

Understanding how leaders make foreign policy and national security decisions is of paramount importance for the policy community and academia. Yet on their own, neither rational nor cognitive schools of decision-making analysis offer totally convincing results, and in any case, rigorous decision analysis methodologies are rarely, if ever, applied to the decisions of world leaders. How Do Leaders Make Decisions?: Evidence from the East and West, Part B, the second in a two-part volume covering a total of ten world leaders, fills this gap by using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method to explore how figures such as Putin, Erdogan, Khaled Mashal, Mao, and Saddam Hussein make or made major decisions of international significance. By analysing the decisions made by key political figures around the world, past and present, the chapters gathered here shed light on how they are reached and what policy implications they have for their own and other nations. The analyses are based on traditional and contemporary theories of foreign policy decision making, including, but not limited to, the rational actor model, the cybernetic theory of decision, poliheuristic theory, and various decision rules, including the elimination-by-aspect rule and the lexicographic decision rule. Cumulatively, what these chapters uncover is that foreign and national security policies can be best explained by tracing the cognitive process leaders go through in formulating and arriving at their decisions. For its groundbreakingly rigorous methodology and its unprecedented scope, this book and its companion book are essential reading for students, scholars, and policymakers alike.

Why do presidents and their advisors often make sub-optimal decisions on military intervention, escalation, de-escalation, and termination of conflicts? The leading concept of group dynamics, groupthink, offers one explanation: policy-making groups make sub-optimal decisions due to their desire for conformity and uniformity over dissent, leading to a failure to consider other relevant possibilities. But presidential advisory groups are often fragmented and divisive. This book therefore scrutinizes polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and divergent policy prescriptions, resulting in a disjointed decision-making process or even decision paralysis. The book analyzes eleven national security decisions, including the national security policy designed prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the decisions to enter into and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2007 "surge" decision, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the UN Security Council decision on the Syrian Civil War, the faltering Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East, and the U.S. decision on military operations against ISIS. Based on the analysis of these case studies, the authors address implications of the polythink phenomenon, including prescriptions for avoiding and/or overcoming it, and develop strategies and tools for what they call Productive Polythink. The authors also show the applicability of polythink to business, industry, and everyday decisions.

Understanding how leaders make foreign policy and national security decisions is of paramount importance for the policy community and academia. This book explores how leaders such as Trump, Obama, Netanyahu and others make decisions using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method. The chapters gathered here analyse the decisions made by key political figures around the world, past and present, in order to shed light on how these decisions are made and what policy implications they have for their own and other nations. Several chapters also focus on military decision making, including around pivotal times in history including the second world war and the evolution of nuclear warfare.

How and why do people make political decisions? This book is the first to present a unified framework of the Behavioral Political Science paradigm. - BPS presents a range of psychological approaches to understanding political decision-making. The integration of these approaches with Rational Choice Theory provides students with a comprehensible paradigm for understanding current political events around the world. Presented in nontechnical language and enlivened with a wealth of real-world examples, this is an ideal core text for a one-semester courses in political science, American government, political psychology, or political behavior. It can also supplement a course in international relations or public policy.

Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations provides a uniquely valuable view of current approaches and findings in conflict studies. This volume showcases work informed by four powerful research tools: rational choice theory and game theory; simulation, experimentation, and artificial intelligence; quantitative studies; and case studies. Each research method is introduced and evaluated for its specific potential, including both strengths and weaknesses. Throughout, the notable contributors clearly explain how they choose, frame, and go about answering questions. While expanding our knowledge of particular conflicts, from the Crimean War to the Vietnam War to ongoing Palestinian-Israeli instability, Multiple Paths also furthers our understanding of how to conduct research in international relations.

Why does the academic study of international relations have limited impact on the policy community? When research results are inconsistent, inconclusive, and contradictory, a lack of scholarly consensus discourages policy makers, the business community, and other citizens from trusting findings and conclusions from IR research. In New Directions for International Relations, Alex Mintz and Bruce Russett identify differences in methods of analysis as one cause of these problematic results. They discuss the problem and set the stage for nine chapters by diverse scholars to demonstrate innovative new developments in IR theory and creative new methods that can lay the basis for greater consensus. Looking at areas of concern such as the relationship between lawmaking and the use of military force, the challenge of suppressing extremists without losing moderates, and the public health effects of civil conflict, contributors show how international relations research can generate reliable results that can be, and in fact are, used in the real world.

Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making presents a decision making approach to foreign policy analysis. This approach focuses on the decision process, dynamics, and outcome, highlighting the role of psychological factors in foreign policy decision making. The book includes a wealth of extended real-world case studies and examples that are woven into the text. The cases and examples, which are written in an accessible style, include decisions made by leaders of the United States, Israel, New Zealand, Cuba, Iceland, United Kingdom, and others. In addition to coverage of the rational model of decision making, levels of analysis of foreign policy decision making, and types of decisions, the book includes extensive material on alternatives to the rational choice model, the marketing and framing of decisions, cognitive biases and errors, and domestic, cultural, and international influences on decision making in international affairs. Existing textbooks do not present such an approach to foreign policy decision making, international relations, American foreign policy, and comparative foreign policy.

Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making presents a decision making approach to foreign policy analysis. This approach focuses on the decision process, dynamics, and outcome, highlighting the role of psychological factors in foreign policy decision making. The book includes a wealth of extended real-world case studies and examples that are woven into the text. The cases and examples, which are written in an accessible style, include decisions made by leaders of the United States, Israel, New Zealand, Cuba, Iceland, United Kingdom, and others. In addition to coverage of the rational model of decision making, levels of analysis of foreign policy decision making, and types of decisions, the book includes extensive material on alternatives to the rational choice model, the marketing and framing of decisions, cognitive biases and errors, and domestic, cultural, and international influences on decision making in international affairs. Existing textbooks do not present such an approach to foreign policy decision making, international relations, American foreign policy, and comparative foreign policy.